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Responding to COVID-19 in Scots law 
Paul F Scott 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In early 2020 there entered the United Kingdom a novel coronavirus, the cause of a disease known 
as COVID-19, which transformed life for millions of people across the world. At the time of 
writing it has cost, on a conservative estimate, almost 2,500 lives in Scotland.1 In an attempt to 
slow its spread, all facets of life were disrupted. Schools were closed, non-essential businesses 
shuttered, and the majority of the population confined to their homes, with predictable but 
nevertheless massive economic impact. This piece offers a preliminary overview of the key strands 
of the response to COVID-19 in Scots law. Such response offers important lessons regarding both 
the legal response to emergencies – in particular, emergencies which differ from the paradigm – 
but also for the light it sheds on the operation of devolution in a context entirely unlike any other 
that has arisen. 
 
2. Background 
 
The novel coronavirus first emerged in China in late 2019 and early 2020, spreading outwards from 
there. The World Health Organisation declared it a pandemic on 11 March 2020, by which time 
the disease had been present in the United Kingdom for around 6 weeks, with evidence of in-
country transmission having taken place around the end of February. Though the situation was by 
any standards an emergency, it might have been accommodated in domestic law in a number of 
different ways, with consequences for the role to be played by devolved institutions. Under the 
devolution settlement, emergency powers are reserved to Westminster,2 but health is devolved. 
Had the pandemic been treated as an issue relating to emergency powers there would have been a 
more limited role for the devolved institutions than in fact eventuated. Regulations made under 
part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 are made by the government at Westminster. Though 
there is an obligation to consult the devolved institutions in advance of making regulations which 
apply to the territory for which they are responsible,3 that is disapplied in cases of urgency.4 The 
                                                     
1 Scottish Government, ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19): daily data for Scotland’ (15 June 2020). The figure 
includes only those who died having previously tested positive for coronavirus. 
2 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5, Head B, Section B11. 
3 Civil Contingencies Act 2004, s 29(1). 
4 CCA 2004, s 29(4). 
United Kingdom chose not to address the pandemic within this emergency powers framework. 
One possible contributing factor was the role of Parliament in the making of CCA regulations,5 
and the knowledge that Parliament would probably have to operate on a reduced basis, as indeed 
happened following the February recess. Instead, the pandemic was treated – correctly – as a public 
health issue, a framing which afforded devolved institutions a much greater role. One result of that 
framing, of course, was to share the political cost of the (potentially unpopular) actions which had 
to be taken between the governments at Westminster and those devolved institutions. 
  
3. The Scots law response – the lockdown 
 
Though the public health framing ensured the close involvement of the devolved institutions, the 
existing powers of the Scottish government in the domain turned out to be limited. For England, 
the key powers – those ultimately used for many of the most significant measures – are found in 
the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984,6 having been inserted into it by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2008. That Act does not extend to Scotland. The result was that while an early 
reliance on voluntary cooperation in England appears to have been part of a deliberate strategy, in 
Scotland that strategy was the only one available to the government: as a number of its early 
communications made clear, when it was asking organisers to cancel events, it had no power to 
require them to do so.7 And so the Bill that became the Coronavirus Act 2020 included not only 
various new powers relating to potentially infectious persons and events and gatherings – each 
coming in four different forms, one for each of the UK jurisdictions8 – but also created for 
Scotland a set of powers broadly equivalent to those which the 2008 Act had made available in 
England.9 To this, the Scottish Parliament readily consented.10  
 
It was these powers which were used to implement the most prominent aspect of the legal 
response to the pandemic, the ‘lockdown’ which began on the evening of March 26. This was 
effected by the Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions) (Scotland) Regulations 2020,11 
                                                     
5 CCA 2004, ss 27 and 28. 
6 Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, Part 2A. 
7 See, eg, Scottish Government, ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19): advice to organisers on mass events’ (15 March 
2020): ‘Under current powers we are only able to provide advice, and cannot instruct organisers to cancel 
events.’ 
8 Coronavirus Act 2020, schedule 20 (powers relating to potentially infectious persons) and 21 (powers 
relating to events, gatherings and premises). 
9 CA 2020, schedule 19. 
10 Legislative Consent Motion S5M-21322 (24 March 2020). 
11 Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions) (Scotland) Regulations 2020, SSI 2020/103. 
broadly similar to the rules put in place in the other jurisdictions. These regulations made 
numerous major intrusions into life as we knew it. They required the closure of non-essential 
businesses.12 They made it unlawful to leave the place where one was living without a reasonable 
excuse for doing so,13 and for more than two people to gather in a public place, except on a number 
of very limited grounds.14 Despite the intrusiveness of these measures, no challenge to them 
appears to have been brought. Throughout, the European Convention on Human Rights 
continued to apply as normal. Unlike a number of other Convention States, the United Kingdom 
did not seek to place the pandemic within the category of a ‘public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation’ by making a derogation from the Convention. It relied instead – if only implicitly – 
upon the various ways in which the Convention might accommodate the response to a pandemic 
in its ordinary functioning. These rules were modified on a number of occasions, and relaxed as 
the spread of the virus was brought under control and the lockdown was progressively lifted.15 
The 2020 Act included powers for the Scottish government to close and otherwise direct schools,16 
but schools had already closed before the Act received Royal Assent. 
 
4. The Scots law response – other elements 
 
Alongside these rules, implemented by secondary legislation under powers rushed into law at 
Westminster, further provision relating to the pandemic was made by the Scottish Parliament, in 
the form of the Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020. The Bill was introduced on 31 March, with all 
Parliamentary stages completed on 1 April. The Act did a number of things, chief amongst them 
introducing protection against eviction during the coronavirus crisis,17 and making a number of 
amendments aimed at permitting the justice system to continue to function in a context in which 
physical presence was not possible.18 What allowed it to pass so quickly through the legislative 
process was what it did not, ultimately, do. The Scottish Government initially proposed to permit 
criminal trials on indictment to take place without juries, allowing ‘at least some trials of the most 
                                                     
12 SSI 2020/103, regulations 3 and 4. 
13 SSI 2020/103, regulation 5. 
14 SSI 2020/103, regulation 6. 
15 Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2020, SSI 2020/106; 
Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions) (Scotland) Amendment (No. 2) Regulations 2020, SSI 
2020/126; Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions) (Scotland) Amendment (No. 3) Regulations 
2020, SSI 2020/164. 
16 CA 2020, schedule 16, part 2 and schedule 17, part 2. See Scottish Ministers, ‘Educational Continuity 
Direction’ (21 May 2020). 
17 Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020, s 2 and schedule 1. 
18 C(S)A 2020, s 5 and schedule 4. 
serious offences to continue to take place notwithstanding the social distancing requirements’,19 
and so avoid the growth of a backlog during the period in which jury trials were suspended. 
Reaction to this proposal was largely hostile,20 and the Scottish government quickly withdrew the 
proposal from the Bill. Also contested were provisions extending timelines for the freedom of 
information process, but these were enacted into law nonetheless.21  
 
A second statute, the Coronavirus Scotland (No 2) Act 2020, however, was amended at 
Stage 2 of the legislative process so as to repeal those provisions.22 Alongside this, it made 
provision relating to, inter alia, notice periods for students in purpose-built accommodation, as 
well as new protections against bankruptcy.23 This process had predictable knock-on effects on the 
Scottish government’s legislative programme, with its ambition to hold a second independence 
referendum in the year 2020 dropped in the early stages of the pandemic.24 Given what is said 
below, however, about inter-governmental relations in the context of the pandemic and the 
prominence of economic issues within the response to it, it is likely that the pandemic and those 
various responses will feature, perhaps prominently, in debates around any future such 
referendum. 
 
5. The reliance on secondary legislation 
 
Though the pandemic was met with a legislative response both at Westminster and at Holyrood, 
a key feature of the legal response was a reliance upon secondary legislation, again both at the 
central and devolved levels. So, for example, up until the middle of June there had been made – 
to use a crude measure – a total of 22 Scottish statutory instruments with ‘coronavirus’ in their 
title.25 Some of those instruments exercised new powers in the various Coronavirus Acts. Others 
weakened or disapplied the operation of vast swathes of administrative law to reflect the changed 
reality of the pandemic situation.  
 
                                                     
19 Coronavirus (Scotland) Bill – Policy Memorandum, SP Bill 66–PM (2020), [239]. 
20 See, eg, Faculty of Advocates and Scottish Criminal Bar Association, Response to Coronavirus (Scotland) Bill, 
(March 2020). 
21 C(S)A 2020, s 7 and schedule 6, part 2. 
22 Coronavirus Scotland (No 2) Act 2020, schedule 4, part 8. 
23 C(S)(No 2)A 2020, schedule 1, parts 1 and 5. 
24 Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, Europe and External Affairs, Letter to the Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster (30 March 2020). 
25 Figure from legislation.gov.uk, as of 15 June 2020. 
The phenomenon of secondary legislation in Scotland has not generally attracted 
significant attention in the era of devolution,26 even as a variety of issues have forced it onto the 
agenda at the UK level. Scrutiny of such instruments is (now) governed by the Interpretation and 
Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010,27 but the procedure to be employed is identified in relation 
to any particular instrument is identified the parent act. So, for example, the schedule to the 
Coronavirus Act 2020 under which the Scottish lockdown regulations were made provides that 
regulations made thereunder are subject to the affirmative procedure but that that requirement 
does not apply if ‘the Scottish Ministers consider that the regulations need to be made urgently’.28 
In such case, the emergency regulations are to be laid before the Parliament, and cease to have 
effect if not approved by it within 28 days of being made.29 All of the ‘lockdown’ regulations made 
by the time of writing, including those loosening the restrictions, have made use of this urgent 
procedure. The effect is that rules imposing massive – even if ultimately proportionate – 
interferences with the rights of the Scottish people were not subject to prior scrutiny and though 
ultimately affirmed by the Parliament, could only have been (as is always the case) accepted to 
rejected in full. A large number of the coronavirus SSIs were not subject even to that level of 
oversight, but subject only to the negative procedure. In many cases that absence will have been 
justifiable by reason of their relatively slight effects, but the pandemic should alert us to the extent 
of the reliance on secondary legislation, and in particular to the loose manner in which urgency is 
understood. 
 
6. Inter-governmental relations during the pandemic 
 
A further constitutional issue which became relevant to coronavirus was that of inter-
governmental relations, which has been a site of (often, but not exclusively, Brexit-related) 
considerable tension in recent years. It is in the nature of a pandemic that no polity’s response is 
self-regarding: an outbreak in one area can, without measures being taken, quickly spread to 
another, and national and international borders by themselves do nothing to contain that spread. 
In the early stages, the Scottish government appeared to hew closely to the approach taken by the 
government at Westminster, diverging mostly in terms of timings and even then only to a small 
degree. One question, then, is whether it had the practical capacity to diverge more strongly had it 
                                                     
26 Though see Chris Himsworth, ‘Subordinate Legislation in the Scottish Parliament’ (2002) 6 Edinburgh 
Law Review 356. 
27 Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010, part 2. 
28 CA 2020, schedule 19, para 6(1) and (2). 
29 CA 2020, schedule 19, para 6(3). 
desired to do so. Relevant here is the source of the scientific advice upon which each government 
was relying, which of course feeds into – though does not determine – political decisions taken in 
response. The more closely aligned was that advice, the more likely that any decisions taken in 
reliance upon it would be similar.  
 
The primary source of scientific advice at Westminster was the Scientific Advisory Group 
for Emergencies (SAGE), relying on input from – amongst others – the New and Emerging 
Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG). The Scottish Government was able to 
send a representative to observer SAGE meetings, but not to fully participate in them: reports 
suggested that its questions had to be submitted in advance of meetings.30. SAGE fed into the 
decisions of the Civil Contingencies Committee – more commonly known as the Cabinet Office 
Briefing Room, or ‘COBRA’ – meetings of which were attended by a representative of the Scottish 
Government: apparently either the Health Secretary or, as the crisis developed, the First Minister. 
Alongside this, the Scottish Government benefits from a discrete infrastructure focused upon the 
Scottish Government Resilience Committee, a sub-committee of the Cabinet whose role is to ‘give 
ministerial oversight to strategic policy and guidance in the context of resilience in Scotland.’31 The 
distinct infrastructure for advising on and making decisions did not though initially result in 
significant policy divergence, even where the law would have allowed it. Instead, divergence was 
evident mostly in the approach to communication, as was most obvious when the Scottish 
government published a document laying out its intended steps at a point in time when the 
government at Westminster was still refusing to discuss the prospect for fear of jeopardising the 
lockdown.32 As the lockdown was unwound, however, differences of approach emerged, with the 
Scottish government noticeably more cautious as to when and how the various restrictions were 
to be lifted.  
 
These surface issues, however, potentially disguise the more fundamental ways in which 
the asymmetry of the modern devolution settlement structured the responses of the two 
governments to the pandemic. Many of the key responses were economic in nature rather than 
strictly legal, in particular the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, estimated to have cost the 
government £15 billion a month. That was carried out on a UK-wide basis, but related actions 
                                                     
30 Severin Carrell, David Pegg, Felicity Lawrence, Paul Lewis, Rob Evans, David Conn, Harry Davies and 
Kate Proctor, ‘Revealed: Cummings is on secret scientific advisory group for Covid-19’, The Guardian (24 
April 2020). 
31 Scottish Government, Preparing Scotland: resilience guidance (March 2012), 28. 
32 Scottish Government, COVID-19 – A Framework for Decision Making (April 2020). 
were taken by the Westminster government in devolved areas, with the Scottish government 
required to decide whether to replicate them using the associated Barnett consequentials. The two 
issues – legal powers and money – are of course intimately connected, as evidenced by discussions 
around the timeline of ending the lockdown. That the Scottish government has in law the power 
to maintain restrictions in force after their equivalents had been lifted in England will not be worth 
very much if there is no Job Retention Scheme, and no money to fund an equivalent. And so 
although the labelling the pandemic as a public health issue rather than one relating to emergency 
powers had implications as regards legislative competence, the fact that the overall response was 
so reliant upon the ability to borrow and spend vast sums in a short period rendered that labelling 
less significant than it would otherwise have been. 
 
7. Conclusion – devolution in the time of coronavirus 
 
At the time of writing, the initial outbreak of COVID-19 is suppressed, though future recurrences 
are anticipated. On the basis of how this first period has unfolded two linked predictions can be 
made. One is that in any future outbreak the economic impact of the coronavirus and measures 
taken to combat it will be at the forefront of the response from the outset. In consequence, the 
response of the United Kingdom government is likely to be proportionately less aggressive than 
was that to the first wave of the virus. Second, the asymmetry of the devolution settlement will 
mean that such an economy-centric approach to a second outbreak will result in a greater political 
tension between the UK and devolved administrations than has been seen so far. The political 
consequences may well be far-reaching. 
 
 
 
